Citizen Financial Group:
Overview:
Citizen Financial Group (CFG) is the 13th largest bank in the US, with a history date back to 1988. It was a subsidiary of Royal Bank of Scotia, before getting spun off in 2014. The bank operates 1150 branches in 11 states across New England, Mid-Atlantic and Midwest regions.
Business
segments:
The company reports 2 segments in its operation: the consumer banking segment and the commercial banking segment. The consumer banking segment serves retail customer and business with less than 2.5 millions in revenue. Product offerings in this segment includes deposit products, mortgage and home equity lending, credit cards, business loans, wealth management, investment services.
Commercial banking serves business
with 2.5 millions to 2.5 billions in revenue. The product offerings include
lending and leasing, deposit and treasury management services, foreign exchange
and interest rate risk management solutions, as well as corporate finance,
merger and acquisition, and debt and equity capital markets capabilities.
Balance sheet
analysis:
Year
|
2017
|
2016
|
2015
|
2014
|
2013
|
|||||
Assets
|
152336
|
100%
|
149520
|
100%
|
138208
|
100%
|
132857
|
100%
|
122154
|
100%
|
Net loan
|
109381
|
72%
|
106433
|
71%
|
97826
|
71%
|
92215
|
69%
|
84638
|
69%
|
Goodwill
|
6887
|
5%
|
6876
|
5%
|
6876
|
5%
|
6876
|
5%
|
6876
|
6%
|
Liabilities
|
132066
|
87%
|
129773
|
87%
|
118562
|
86%
|
113589
|
85%
|
102958
|
84%
|
Deposit
|
115089
|
76%
|
109804
|
73%
|
102539
|
74%
|
95707
|
72%
|
86903
|
71%
|
Common equity
|
20270
|
13%
|
19747
|
13%
|
19646
|
14%
|
19268
|
15%
|
19196
|
16%
|
Tangible common equity
|
13383
|
9%
|
12871
|
9%
|
12770
|
9%
|
12392
|
9%
|
12320
|
10%
|
Given the high percentage of net loans as a
percentage of assets, CFG is a typical traditional bank that raise deposit and
make loans. In terms of capitalization,
the company’s equity/assets ratio is 13%, which is above the industry’s median
of 11%. However, because CFG’s goodwill item is quite large relative to other
banks, the tangible common equity / assets is only 9%, which is relatively low
compares to the overall industry.
Assets:
Year
|
2017
|
2016
|
||
Assets
|
152336
|
100%
|
149520
|
100%
|
Securities
|
24842
|
16%
|
24572
|
16%
|
Net loan
|
109381
|
72%
|
106433
|
71%
|
Goodwill
|
6887
|
5%
|
6876
|
5%
|
The table above shows the largest items on the
bank’s balance sheet.
Securities:
Total Securities
|
25716
|
25597
|
24114
|
The securities portfolio is composed
mostly of mortgage-backed securities issued by Federal agencies and U.S.
government sponsored entities. The whole securities portfolio represents only a
small portion of the bank’s assets.
Loans and
leases portfolio:
Year
|
2017
|
2016
|
2015
|
2014
|
2013
|
Commercial loans and leases
|
52031
|
51651
|
46214
|
43226
|
39395
|
YOY growth
|
0.7%
|
11.8%
|
6.9%
|
9.7%
|
|
Retail loans
|
58586
|
56018
|
52828
|
50184
|
46464
|
YOY growth
|
4.6%
|
6.0%
|
5.3%
|
8.0%
|
|
Total loans and leases
|
110617
|
107669
|
99042
|
93410
|
85859
|
YOY growth
|
2.7%
|
8.7%
|
6.0%
|
8.8%
|
As of December 2017, 47% of the loans
and leases portfolio is made up of commercial loan and leases, while the
remaining balance goes to retail/consumer loans. The bank has followed this
loan portfolio structure of 46-47% commercial loans vs 53-54% consumer loans
since 2013 (the oldest reported figure), and show no signed of deviating from
this structure. CFG’s loan portfolio is typical in comparison with the big 4
(BOA, WF, Citi, JP Morgan), and does not raise any concerns. Also, growth of
the loans and leases portfolio slowed down in 2017.
Consumer portfolio:
Year
|
2017
|
2016
|
2015
|
2014
|
2013
|
Residential mortgage
|
17045
|
15115
|
13318
|
11832
|
9726
|
Home equity line of credit
|
13483
|
14100
|
14674
|
15423
|
15667
|
Automobile
|
13204
|
13938
|
13828
|
12706
|
9397
|
Education
|
8134
|
6610
|
4359
|
2256
|
2208
|
Total consumer loans and leases
|
58586
|
56018
|
52828
|
50184
|
46464
|
*The sum of
the listed segment is not equals to the total due to some smaller segments have
been left out.
The table above presents the largest
categories of the bank’s consumer loans and leases. There are two notable
trends. Firstly, the company has been reducing its home equity line of credit
segment, although it is still representing a large portion of the total
portfolio. Secondly, the company has been aggressively growing its education
loans, which has over the past 5 years have grown from an insignificant portion
of the portfolio into one of the larger categories.
Allowance/Non-accrual
|
Allowance/Impaired loans
|
|
BOA - Consumer
|
104%
|
30%
|
WF - Consumer
|
99%
|
36%
|
Citi - Consumer excluding credit
card
|
313%
|
150%
|
JP Morgan Chase - Consumer
excluding credit card
|
103%
|
59%
|
CFG - Retail/Consumer segment
|
91%
|
72%
|
BOA - Consumer real estate
|
34%
|
10%
|
CFG - Consumer residential mortgage
|
34%
|
29%
|
CFG - Home equity line of credit
|
37%
|
44%
|
CFG - Automobile
|
199%
|
604%
|
CFG - Education
|
316%
|
69%
|
The table above presents the
allowance for loans and leases loss to non-accrual loans ratios and the
allowance for loans and leases loss to impaired loans ratios of CFG’s consumer
segment and the big four banks. CFG’s allowance/non-accrual ratio of the whole
consumer segment is lower than each of the big four, which shows that it is
less conservative in its allowance recording. Furthermore, the ratio is less
than one, which is also not ideal. On the other hand, CFG’s allowance/impaired
ratio is the second highest of the five. However, a closer look reveals that
the each bank have different policies for classifying impaired loans, thus
making the allowance/impaired loans ratio less reliable. Overall, CFG’s
allowance policy is slightly less conservative than the big four.
Due to the lack of categorization in
the report of the big four, the only available ratios are of the consumer
real-estate segment of the Bank of America. The comparison shows similar
allowance/non-accrual ratio between CFG and the Bank of America, which is a
reassuring sign since this is the largest category in CFG’s consumer loans and
leases portfolio. Automobile and Education both have a significantly higher
allowance/non-accrual ratio, which is expected as these loans are not backed by
any collateral, which deem them more risky.
Commercial
portfolio:
Year
|
2017
|
2016
|
2015
|
2014
|
2013
|
Commercial loans
|
37562
|
37274
|
33264
|
31431
|
28667
|
Commercial real-estate
|
11308
|
10624
|
8971
|
7809
|
6948
|
Total commercial loans and leases
|
52031
|
51651
|
46214
|
43226
|
39395
|
The table above presents the two categories
within CFG’s commercial loans and leases portfolio. Overall, commercial loans
has been constituting approximately 72% of the total portfolio over the year.
Commercial real-estate has been growing faster than the total portfolio. As of
2017, the commercial real-estate category make up 21.7% of the portfolio, up
from 17.6% in 2013.
Allowance/Non-accrual
|
Allowance/Impaired loans
|
|
BOA - Commercial
|
444%
|
240%
|
WF - Commercial
|
251%
|
167%
|
Citi - Commercial
|
128%
|
N/A
|
JP Morgan Chase - Commercial
|
239%
|
296%
|
CFG - Commercial
|
292%
|
209%
|
*Citi does not
report impaired loans for the commercial segment
The table above presents the
allowance for loans and leases loss to non-accrual loans ratios and the
allowance for loans and leases loss to impaired loans ratios of CFG’s
commercial segment and the big four banks. The allowance covers the non-accrual
loans almost 3 times, which is a reassuring sign that the bank is being
conservative in their allowance recording. In comparison, CFG’s is higher than
3 of the big four banks, which shows that they are relatively more conservative
in recording allowance for their commercial loans.
Summary:
Overall,
the loans and leases portfolio of the bank has a typical structure. Growth
slowed down in 2017, compares to the previous 4 years. The bank’s allowance
recording policy is slightly less conservative for the consumer portfolio,
while being slightly more conservative for the commercial portfolio. There is
no major concerns about the health of CFG’s loans and leases portfolio.
Liability
Side:
Deposit:
2017
|
2016
|
2015
|
2014
|
2013
|
|
Deposits
|
115089
|
109804
|
102539
|
95707
|
86903
|
YOY growth
|
0.048131
|
0.070851
|
0.071385
|
0.101308
|
-0.08665
|
Deposits growth slowed down slightly in 2017,
due to a decrease in money market accounts.
Income
Statement Analysis:
Year ended Dec 31
|
2017
|
2016
|
2015
|
2014
|
2013
|
|
Net interest income
|
4173
|
3758
|
3402
|
3301
|
3058
|
|
Provision for credit loss
|
321
|
369
|
302
|
319
|
479
|
|
Non-interest income
|
1534
|
1497
|
1422
|
1678
|
1632
|
|
Non-interest expense
|
3474
|
3352
|
3259
|
3392
|
3279
|
|
Income befor income tax
|
1912
|
1534
|
1263
|
1268
|
932
|
|
Efficiency ratio
|
60.87%
|
63.80%
|
67.56%
|
68.12%
|
||
Net income
|
1652
|
1045
|
840
|
865
|
674
|
|
ROA
|
1.10%
|
0.73%
|
0.62%
|
0.68%
|
||
ROE
|
8.35%
|
5.23%
|
4.30%
|
4.46%
|
||
ROTCE
|
12.35%
|
7.74%
|
6.45%
|
6.71%
|
||
Net income assuming 21% effective
income tax
|
1510.48
|
1211.86
|
997.77
|
1001.72
|
736.28
|
|
ROA
|
1.00%
|
0.84%
|
0.74%
|
0.79%
|
0.59%
|
|
ROE
|
7.55%
|
6.15%
|
5.13%
|
5.21%
|
3.40%
|
|
ROTCE
|
11.51%
|
9.45%
|
7.93%
|
8.11%
|
5.86%
|
|
Before the spin-off in 2014, the
bank was in shamble after the 2008 crisis. ROA and ROE in the four years
leading up to the spin-off were only half of the whole industry. A high
efficiency ratio in the high 60s and an above average provision for credit loss
left the bank with a below average net margin. Since the spin-off, management
has been pushing to turnover the bank’s financial performance. CFG raises deposits,
drove up its loan and leases portfolio while keeping non-interest expense
tight. By 2017, a combination of lower efficiency ratio and improved credit
quality has brought ROA and ROE back to the average level of the industry.
However, their result is only average within the US banking industry.
Interest
Earning Power:
CFG
|
BOA
|
WF
|
|||||
% of
assets
|
Yield
|
% of
assets
|
Yield
|
% of
assets
|
Yield
|
||
Assets
|
|||||||
Total
investment securities
|
17%
|
2.43%
|
41%
|
2.05%
|
41%
|
2.24%
|
|
Total
loans and leases
|
73%
|
3.87%
|
40%
|
3.97%
|
49%
|
4.35%
|
|
Total
interest earning assets
|
92%
|
3.56%
|
85%
|
3.04%
|
92%
|
3.40%
|
|
Total
non-interest earning assets
|
8%
|
0.00%
|
15%
|
0.00%
|
8%
|
||
Total
assets
|
100%
|
100%
|
100%
|
||||
Liabilities
|
|||||||
Total
interest-bearing deposits
|
56%
|
0.53%
|
37%
|
0.23%
|
49%
|
0.32%
|
|
Total
borrowed funds
|
10%
|
1.96%
|
24%
|
2.01%
|
19%
|
1.73%
|
|
Total
interest-bearing liabilities
|
66%
|
0.75%
|
61%
|
0.94%
|
68%
|
0.72%
|
|
Demand
deposits
|
19%
|
0.00%
|
19%
|
0.00%
|
19%
|
||
Total
Liabilities
|
87%
|
88%
|
89%
|
||||
Net
interest spread
|
2.81%
|
2.10%
|
2.87%
|
||||
Return
on average assets
|
1.10%
|
0.80%
|
1.15%
|
||||
Return
on average equity
|
8.35%
|
6.72%
|
11.35%
|
||||
Return
on average tangible equity
|
12.35%
|
9.41%
|
13.55%
|
||||
The table above presents the average balance of assets and liabilities accounts as a percentage of total assets and their respective yield. Most of CFG’s interest earning assets are allocated to its loans and leases portfolio, which accounts for 73% of total assets. Due to a high concentration of its assets in the loans and leases portfolio, the bank’s yield on average interest earning assets is the highest among the three banks. In contrast, the Bank of America allocate a significant of their interest earning assets into investment securities. 16% of its assets are allocated to safe investments such as deposits at the Federal Reserves and other banks, Federal Fund resell agreements. Another 19% of BOA assets are allocated to debt securities, majorly in agency mortgage-backed securities. Due to a large allocation of assets into safer investments, BOA’s yield on average interest earning assets is the lowest of the three banks. Similar to BOA, Wells Fargo allocates a significant of their interest earning assets into investment securities. 14% of its assets are allocated to safe investments such as deposits at the Federal Reserves and other banks, Federal Fund resell agreements. Another 21% of its assets are allocated to debt securities, majorly agency mortgage-backed securities. However, due to a higher allocation into higher yield securities and loans and leases portfolio, as well as an overall higher yield on investment, WF is able to maintain a high yield on average interest earning assets.
Most of CFG’s interest bearing
liabilities comes from interest-bearing deposits. However, it bear a higher
yield compares to BOA and Wells Fargo, which can be attribute to the superior
brand name and reputation of BOA and Wells Fargo. Of the three banks, CFG
raised the least capital from borrowed funds, with 10% of average assets raised
from borrowed fund. On the other hand, BOA raised the most capital from
borrowed funds, at 24%. It also bear the highest yield on its debt. The three
banks all have 19% of average assets raised from demand deposits. Overall, CFG
has the second lowest yield on its interest bearing liabilities. This is due to
the bank raising fund mostly from the interest earning deposit. BOA raised the
most debt out of the three bank, which results in the highest yield on interest
bearing liabilities. Wells Fargo enjoys the lowest yield on interest bearing
liabilities, due to the bank’s raising a large proportion of funds from
interest bearing deposits as well as the lowest yield on borrowed fund.
Overall, CFG and Wells Fargo
allocation of assets are more risky compares to BOA, which allow them to earns
higher ROA and ROE. However, CFG’s higher concentration of assets to its loans
and leases portfolio deem it riskier than Wells Fargo’s assets, which means
that Wells Fargo earns a higher risk-adjusted return compares to CFG.
Glassdoor
reviews:
CFG
|
BOA
|
WF
|
|
Overall rating
|
3.2
|
3.6
|
3.5
|
Approval of CEO
|
74%
|
84%
|
76%
|
Positive business outlook
|
50%
|
58%
|
52%
|
The table above represents the
scores of the three banks on Glassdoor. Overall, CFG received lower rating in
all aspect compares to the other two banks. Reading through the first 10 pages
of reviews, the following concerns are raised:
- The bank is sales driven.
- The bank has a political environment.
- Layoff and employee shortage is an apparent problem.
- The bank is using very outdated technology, which sometimes hinder employee’s performance and customer services.
- A bias HR department, which is somewhat confirmed by the fact that HR only replies to positive reviews or to reviews that address illegal sales practices.
- A few complaints about illegal sales practice.
The conclusion to be drawn is that
CFG as an organization is rather mediocre. The outdated technology raised
question about the bank’s statement in its annual report regarding “modernizing
its technology and developing enhanced data analytic capabilities”.
Valuation and market sentiment:
Price/Book:
CFG
|
BOA
|
WF
|
|
Price/Book
|
0.95
|
1.28
|
1.56
|
Price/Tangible Book
|
1.46
|
1.81
|
1.85
|
The table above
represents the price/book and price/tangible book of the three banks on the 14th
of August 2018. CFG is valued lower compared to BOA and WF, which is expected,
as the other two banks enjoy higher reputation and operation. I decided to look
into the bank when seeing a price/book value of less than 1. However, due to a
large goodwill account on its balance sheet, the price/tangible book value
comes in at 1.46, which is not cheap in any sense.
DCF:
Given
that the stock does not look cheap when looking at P/B, I decided to quickly
value it using a DCF model (earning-based). The following are the assumptions
and the reasonings:
- Earnings will rise at 5% for 10 years, then 3% for the next 10 years: CFG is a very mediocre bank. It operates under the traditional branch model, which means that there is little room to cut cost and improve the efficiency ratio. The company’s operations is full of problems: political culture, outdated technology, poor HR department. It’s brand name does not yield it any advantage in pricing, which is evident by its high yield on interest-bearing deposits. Loans and deposits have slowed down in the most recent year. The company has a poor track record during and in the aftermath of the 2008 Recession. As a result, there is no reason to believe that the bank will be able to put out any spectacular growth in the future. Therefore, I assigned a 5% growth rate in the first 10 years, and 3% (roughly inflation) for the next 10 years.
- Projecting out 20 years: due to the bank’s long history, large size and operating in a fairly stable, I decided to take into account the cash flow of the next 20 years.
- Cost of capital of 9%: the long-term return of the stock market.
The result is a
P/E ratio of 13.3, which is roughly the same as the current P/E ratio of the
stock. This shows that the stock is fairly valued, and there is little upside
potential as well as margin of safety.
Market Sentiment:
The market seems
to be bullish on CFG. In the past year and a half, there has been 5 analysts’
upgrades on the stock, and only 1 analysts’ downgrade. Short float sits at a
modest 2.61%, while the stock has already doubled in the last 2 years and a
half. Overall, there is no pessimisms in the market to bet against.
Conclusion:
CFG is an large
in size, but average in operation bank that in recent years has improve its
operation and financial result after its spin-off in 2014. Analysis of the
bank’s balance sheet shows a healthy loans and leases portfolio with healthy
credit quality. The bank’s strategy focus on allocating assets to loans and
leases, deeming it more risky compares to other large banks such as BOA and WF.
ROA, ROE, ROTCE and efficiency ratio sit at industry average. Growth in deposit
and loans and leases has and continued to slow down in 2018. Efficiency ratio
has improved in recent years, but given its branch-focus operation, it does not
seem likely for the company to significantly drive down that figure. There are
a few concerns regarding its operation, including a political work environment,
outdated technology, weakness in its HR department, and a few complaints about
illegal sales practices. As for the stock, a 1.46 Price/Tangible book ratio is
not cheap in any sense, and the DCF model shows that the stock is fairly
valued. Furthermore, looking at analyst recommendations, there is no pessimisms
in the market to bet against. In conclusion, the stock has little upside
potential and does not offer and margin for error, and thus I recommend a ‘hold/sell’
for the stock.
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